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2010: A SECOND ODYSSEY INTO ARKANSAS LAND-USE LAW
Buckley W. Bridges*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Professor Robert R. Wright published his comprehensive Zon-
ing Law in Arkansas: A Comparative Analysis.' For the past thirty years,
that insight into Arkansas's land-use law has stood alone. Needless to say,
the past three decades have seen both seismic shifts and subtle undulations
in various areas of life and the law. The law of land-use is no different;
however, unlike many other areas of the law, no recent attempt has been
made to collect, catalogue, and analyze those changes.
To control the scope of the analysis, this article is divided into four
sections: one substantive, one structural, one procedural, and an appendix.
First, it will look back at Professor Wright's article and supply updates on
the areas of law that have changed (or have failed to change) over the inter-
vening years. 2 Second, the article will address the nature of the govern-
ment's power to regulate land-use, the body that may exercise that power,
and the manner in which the appropriate body may wield that power.3
Third, the article will treat the most salient changes in the procedure used to
litigate land-use decisions.4  Finally, the article includes an appendix,
which the author hopes will aid readers and researchers studying Arkansas's
enabling legislation.
II. ZONING LAW IN ARKANSAS: THIRTY YEARS LATER
Plus ga change, plus c'est la mime chose.6
As the purpose of this section is to update various aspects of Professor
Wright's original analysis, a quick review of his article is a fitting place to
start. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Professor Wright found Arkansas's
* The author is an associate at the Hughes & Hughes Law Firm in Arkadelphia, Ar-
kansas. He would like to thank Professor Carl Circo, Professor of Law at the University of
Arkansas School of Law, for his impeccable observations and advice. He would also like to
thank the attorneys at Harrington, Miller, Kieklak, Eichmann & Brown, P.A. in Springdale,
Arkansas for introducing and substantially educating him in this area of Arkansas law. Fi-
nally, he would like to thank his wife, Emily, for her loving patience and support.
1. Robert R. Wright, Zoning Law in Arkansas: A Comparative Analysis, 3 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 421 (1980).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part Ill.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra App. "A." The enabling act is codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-401-
426 (LEXIS Repl. 1998) (previously codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-2825 to -2833).
6. "The more things change, the more they stay the same."
9
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land-use law to be underdeveloped.' Surprisingly, this observation holds
true today. For more than a generation, the development of large swaths of
land-use law has been either neglected or obstructed.' Although the follow-
ing list of topics is not comprehensive (even measured against Professor
Wright's article), it highlights the main developments and the most striking
stagnation in the law: aesthetics, extra-territorial jurisdiction, spot zoning,
conditional-use permits, planned-unit developments, and the Pfeifer Rule.9
A. Aesthetics as a Basis for Land-Use Decisions
Professor Wright read the enabling statutes to "permit zoning to be ex-
ercised to promote aesthetic purposes only,"10 but at the time of his article,
the "Arkansas cases . . . suggest[ed] otherwise."" Instead, he found Arkan-
sas to be in line with the majority rule at the time-that "aesthetic benefits
must be accompanied by some other valid police power consideration."1 2
Shortly after his analysis, however, Arkansas courts changed their tune.
Before discussing the current law, however, it is necessary to investigate the
source of Professor Wright's concern.
Professor Wright cited City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc.,1 decided in
1977, for the proposition that Arkansas courts disfavored aesthetics as a
basis for zoning.14 In retrospect, it is clear the court was speaking out of
both sides of its mouth. For instance, the court held that it would not strike
down an ordinance "merely because aesthetic purposes are taken into con-
sideration, if those purposes are merely incidental to the exercise of the po-
lice power in the interest of the public health, safety, morals or welfare."15
Later the court reinforced this sentiment stating, "The fact that aesthetic
considerations [are] a significant factor in the exercise of the police power
should not invalidate an ordinance for an otherwise legitimate police-power
objective."' 6 Both of these citations clearly support Wright's proposition
that Arkansas courts find aesthetics an insufficient basis for land-use regula-
tion.
7. Wright, supra note 1, at 421.
8. See infra Part IV (largely dealing with one mechanism of "obstruction").
9. Wright, supra note 1, at 425 passim.
10. Id. at 426.
11. Id
12. Id
13. 261 Ark. 148, 547 S.W.2d 94 (1977).
14. Wright, supra note 1, at 426.
15. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. at 164, 547 S.W.2d at 103 (emphasis added) (citing Herring v.
Stannus, 169 Ark. 244, 275 S.W. 321 (1924)).
16. Id. at 165, 547 S.W.2d at 103 (emphasis added) (citing Naegele Outdoor Adver. Co.
v. Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968)).
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Between the two above quoted sentences, however, the court had
something interesting to say in support of aesthetic zoning. The court noted
that "public welfare is a broad concept" and that Fayetteville's board found
"the existence of signs" to be "detrimental to its scenic resources," which
affected its "economic development." 7 The court approved this as "a con-
stitutionally permissible objective under the police power of the state."" If
the court meant what it said in this paragraph, it apparently approved of all
aesthetic regulation, given that almost any regulation primarily serving aes-
thetics will have some accidental and ancillary positive effect on the public.
In other words, if the court meant City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc. to be
the test for the permissibility of aesthetic land-use regulation, any aesthetic
regulation should pass.
In addition, the general attitude throughout the country has changed.
At one time, courts considered aesthetics a "matter of luxury and indulgence
rather than a matter of necessity." 9 Today, courts generally hold that "zon-
ing laws are valid even though they may have as their purpose, in part or
whole, the promotion of esthetic considerations." 20 Arkansas has followed
the national trend.
The Arkansas Supreme Court endorsed the modern view most robustly
in City of Fayetteville v. McIlroy Bank & Trust Co. 21 There, the court first
recognized the national trend: "At one time the courts held pretty generally
that zoning ordinances could not be sustained if they rested primarily or
solely upon aesthetic considerations, but that point of view is disappear-
ing." 2 2 The court went on to make the following sweeping pronouncement:
"If the inhabitants of a city or town want to make the surroundings in which
they live and work more beautiful or more attractive or more charming,
there is nothing in the constitution forbidding the adoption of reasonable
17. Id., 547 S.W.2d at 103. The specific findings of the Fayetteville board follow:
That a large and increasing number of tourists have been visiting the City of
Fayetteville, Arkansas, and as a result, the tourist industry is a direct source of
income for citizens of said city, with an increasing number of persons directly or
indirectly dependent upon the tourist industry for their livelihood. Scenic re-
sources are distributed throughout the city, and have contributed greatly to its
economic development, by attracting tourists, permanent and part-time residents,
and new industries and cultural facilities. The scattering of signs throughout the
city is detrimental to the preservation of those scenic resources, and so to the
economic base of the city, and is also not an effective method of providing in-
formation to tourists about available facilities.
Id. at 164, 547 S.W.2d at 103.
18. Id., 547 S.W.2d at 103 (citing E.B. Elliot Adver. Co. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 425 F.2d
1141 (5th Cir. 1970)).
19. 8 MCQUILLIN, MUN. ON CORP. § 25.29 (3d ed. 2009).
20. Id.
21. 278 Ark. 500, 647 S.W.2d439(1983).
22. McIlroy Bank & Trust Co., 278 Ark. at 502, 647 S.W.2d at 440.
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measures to attain that goal." 2 3 With only six years and no geography be-
tween them (both cases arise out of Fayetteville), S & H, Inc. and Mcllroy
Bank & Trust clearly evidence a tidal shift in Arkansas's view of aesthetic
regulation. The former couches its endorsement (if it can be called that) in
negatives, while the other positively exclaims the virtues of aestheticism.
As of this writing, McIlroy Bank & Trust remains the single strongest expo-
sition from the court on aesthetics.
Almost immediately after McIlroy Bank & Trust, the court began a lin-
guistic, and perhaps legal, coupling that remains with us today. In Donrey
Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville,24 the court upheld an or-
dinance based upon "the legitimate governmental interests in traffic safety,
the aesthetic landscape and the tourism industry." 25 First, note that this is
another City of Fayetteville case, and second, note that this decision came
down only seven months after McIlroy Bank & Trust.26 The primary differ-
ence is that Donrey Communications hinges on whether the governmental
interests are substantial enough to survive a First Amendment challenge,27
whereas McIlroy Bank & Trust focuses generally on the "reasonableness" of
the ordinance.28
Despite its differences from McIlroy Bank, Donrey Communications,
on its own terms, follows the trend of endorsing aesthetics as a stand-alone
purpose for regulating land use. Independent of the traffic safety concerns,
the Arkansas Supreme Court cites numerous Supreme Court of the United
States decisions as precedent for the proposition that aesthetics is a "sub-
stantial governmental goal." 2 9 Later, the court goes on to observe that
"[m]any courts have rejected the argument that it is unreasonable to prohibit
billboards in commercial and industrial areas of little, if any, natural beau-
ty." 30 Therefore, despite its coupling aesthetics with traffic safety, it is clear
that the Donrey Communications court considered aesthetics a stand-alone
principle upon which to base local land-use decisions.
23. Id. at 503, 647 S.W.2d at 441.
24. 280 Ark. 408, 660 S.W.2d 900 (1983).
25. Id. at 414, 660 S.W.2d at 903.
26. Compare City of Fayetteville v. Mcliroy Bank & Trust Co., 278 Ark. 500, 502, 647
S.W.2d 439, 440 (1983), with Donrey Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 280 Ark. 408,
660 S.W.2d 900 (1983).
27. See Donrey Commc'ns, 280 Ark. at 412-14, 660 S.W.2d at 902-03.
28. See generally Mci/roy Bank & Trust, 278 Ark. 500, 647 S.W.2d 439.
29. Donrey Commc'ns, 280 Ark. at 413, 660 S.W.2d at 903 (citing Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Ber-
man v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
30. Id. at 417, 660 S.W.2d at 905 (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490 (1981); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 610 P.2d 407 (1980); John Donnel-
ly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor
Adver. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975); E.B. Elliott Adver. Co. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 425 F.2d
1141 (5th Cir. 1970)).
[Vol. 3312
LAND-USE LAW
Since then, the court has considered aesthetics and traffic safety as
twin goals. In 1992, the Arkansas Supreme Court found "traffic safety and
aesthetics" formed "a rational basis" for legislation.3' In 1998, the court
applied the since discredited Agins analysis to conclude that "the legitimate
state interests of promoting aesthetics and traffic safety" were substantially
advanced by the regulation.32 The 1992 case uses the singular indefinite
article "a" when describing the two concerns and cites Donrey Communica-
tions for the proposition. By contrast, the 1998 case cites traffic safety
and aesthetics as "state interests," in the plural rather than in the singular,
using Mcllroy Bank & Trust, as well as the 1992 case to support the propo-
sition.3 4 In sum, even though the more recent cases examine aesthetics
along with traffic safety, precedent makes clear that this coupling is not
essential to the validity of an ordinance based solely upon aesthetic con-
cerns. Today, Arkansas law strongly supports the idea that aesthetic con-
cerns are rational and legitimate reasons to regulate land-use.
B. Cities and Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction 35
The judiciary is not the only branch of government that has expanded
the permissible scope of zoning. The legislature has also expanded or ra-
ther, restored its delegation of land-use control power to municipalities.
Professor Wright was deeply concerned with the General Assembly's repeal
of "original authority permitting cities to exercise extraterritorial zoning
power." 36 In fact, he described it as "probably the most damaging land use
regulation ever passed by the General Assembly." 37 Since then, the General
Assembly has apparently come around to Professor Wright's point of view
and has restored the original authority of cities to exercise extra-territorial
jurisdiction up to five miles outside of the corporate limits.38
31. City of Hot Springs v. Carter, 310 Ark. 405, 407, 836 S.W.2d 863, 864 (1992).
32. Craft v. City of Fort Smith, 335 Ark. 417, 427, 984 S.W.2d 22, 27 (1998). Although
the quoted phrase from Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), purports to describe a takings
analysis, the Supreme Court later clarified that the Agins "formula prescribes an inquiry in
the nature of a due process, not a takings test, and that it has no proper place in our takings
jurisprudence." Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005). Whatever appli-
cability the Agins "substantially advances" formula has in the due process arena (and it may
have none), it should no longer be used to determine whether land-use legislation works a
regulatory taking.
33. Carter, 310 Ark. at 407, 836 S.W.2d at 863.
34. Craft, 335 Ark. at 427, 984 S.W.2d at 27.
35. "Extra-territorial jurisdiction" refers to the power of a government actor to act out-
side of its borders.
36. Wright, supra note 1, at 428.
37. Id.
38. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-413(a)(1)(A) (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
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This restored extra-territorial planning power of cities includes some
limitations. First, the power vests only in cities of the first and second class
and incorporated towns that have created planning commissions.39 In addi-
tion, when two cities lie within ten miles of one another, their extra-
territorial jurisdictions terminate at a line equidistant between them.40
Plainly, these statutory limitations are not very robust. A city is likely to
meet the first condition-creation of a planning commission-before any
worry of exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction arises because most cities
will want to control internal development before focusing their attention
outward. The second condition is really less of a limitation and more of a
rule designed to avoid conflict between cities lying within ten miles of one
another.
With the enabling statutes providing mild proscriptions in this area, the
primary limitations on the extra-territorial planning jurisdiction have come
from the judiciary. In 2002, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated, "A muni-
cipality clearly does not have absolute power to control water projects with-
in its own boundaries, much less within its five-mile extraterritorial plan-
ning area."A' Reading the powers granted to the Arkansas Natural Re-
sources Commission in harmony with the Enabling Statutes, the court de-
termined that while a city "may prepare plans" within its extra-territorial
jurisdiction, "all water development projects must still comply with the Ar-
kansas Water Plan."4 2 The court's construction of the statutes in that man-
ner allowed Centerton to provide water to residents outside of its borders
but within the borders of Bentonville's extra-territorial jurisdiction.43
In another water-related case, the court construed a municipal annexa-
tion statute in such a way as to limit the extra-territorial planning power. In
City of Jacksonville v. City of Sherwood,"4 landowners petitioned to have
their property annexed into Sherwood to gain access to its municipal utili-
ties even though their properties lay within the extra-territorial jurisdiction
39. The legislature gave the general power to "adopt and enforce plans for . . . develop-
ment of the municipality and its environs" only to first and second class cities and incorpo-
rated towns. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-402 (LEXIS Repl. 1998). In addition, only cities
having a planning commission have extended jurisdiction. Jd. § 14-56-413(a)(1)(A).
40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-413(a)(1)(B) (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
41. Ark. Soil and Water Conservation Comm'n v. City of Bentonville, 351 Ark. 289,
300, 92 S.W.3d 47, 54 (2002). Please note that as of 2005, the "Arkansas Soil and Water
Conservation Commission" has been renamed the "Arkansas Natural Resources Commis-
sion." 2005 Ark. Acts 1243. 1 will refer to the Commission by its new name.
42. Ark. Soil and Water Conservation Comm'n, 351 Ark. at 300, 92 S.W.3d at 54 (con-
struing ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-503(e), 14-56-413).
43. Id., 92 S.W.3d at 54.
44. 375 Ark. 107, 289 S.W.3d 90 (2008).
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of Jacksonville.45 To resolve the case in the landowners' favor, the court
relied both on Arkansas Soil & Water Conservation Commission v. City of
Bentonville and the general principle that a land-use plan "is a policy state-
ment to be implemented by zoning regulations, and it is the latter that has
the force of the law."46 Taking this case in conjunction with its predecessor,
it is clear that the mere plan to exercise control over the five-mile territory
surrounding a city is not enough to actually affect control of that area. In
order to maintain control of its extra-territorial planning area, a city must
actually regulate that area through the enactment of ordinances and regula-
tions.47
Finally, the legislature and the voters have likely abrogated a once rec-
ognized limit on cities' extra-territorial power. In Butler v. City of Little
Rock,48 a planning dispute arose between the city and the county. 49 The
court construed Article VII, Section 28 of the Arkansas Constitution to give
"exclusive original jurisdiction" to county courts over planning within the
county.50 The court stated that "[w]here there is a conflict over the exercise
of jurisdiction (over matters mentioned in said Section 28) between the
county court and any creature of the Legislature the latter must give way." 5 '
Even though the case hinged on the county's power over "roads," the court
made clear that its decision "concerned primarily, though not necessarily
exclusively" that area of planning.5 2 The actual constitutional provision
grants jurisdiction over "every other case that may be necessary to the inter-
nal improvement and local concerns of the respective counties."5  Since
then, however, the Arkansas Constitution and the statutes have changed.
In the 1974 election, voters approved Amendment LV to the Arkansas
Constitution of 1874. That amendment provides, "A county acting through
its Quorum Court may exercise local legislative authority not denied by the
Constitution or by law."5 4 Subsequently, the General Assembly stated that
"[e]ach county quorum court . . . exercising local legislative authority is
prohibited the exercise of . .. any legislative act that conflicts with the exer-
cise by municipalities of any expressed, implied, or essential powers of mu-
45. Id. at 114-15, 289 S.W.3d at 95-96.
46. Id. at 114, 289 S.W.3d at 95 (citing Taylor v. City of Little Rock, 266 Ark. 384,
387-88, 583 S.W.2d 72, 74 (1979)).
47. See, e.g., Potter v. City of Tontitown, 371 Ark. 200, 211-12, 264 S.W.3d 473, 481-
82 (2007) (discussing that the lower court's determination that Tontitown's ordinances go-
verned the subject property was not reviewed on appeal).
48. 231 Ark. 834, 332 S.W.2d 812 (1960).
49. Id. at 834, 332 S.W.2d at 812.
50. Id. at 837, 332 S.W.2d at 814; see also ARK. CONST. art. VII § 28.
51. Id., 332 S.W.2d at 814.
52. Id., 332 S.W.2d at 814.
53. ARK. CONST. art. V1l § 28.
54. ARK. CONST. amend. LV § 1(a).
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nicipal government."55 Since the power to regulate land-use derives from
the state's expressly delegated police power to municipal governments,
counties must now give way to the land-use decisions of cities that may
conflict with their own.56 Furthermore, the enabling statutes for counties
indicate through negative implication that the extra-territorial powers of a
city trump the zoning and planning powers of counties in all cases except
those where "a new community has been or is being developed with funds
[from] the federal government under . .. the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act." 5 7 If the General Assembly intended counties' land-use powers
to supersede those of cities, section 14-17-210 would not be qualified by the
previously quoted clause; instead, it would simply state, "The county plan-
ning board shall have the exclusive zoning and planning jurisdiction over all
unincorporated areas lying within a county and along a navigable stream
notwithstanding the fact that such areas may be within five (5) miles of the
corporate limits of a city having a planning commission." Furthermore,
note that the county planning board's "exclusive" jurisdiction is limited to
"unincorporated areas" and only those "along a navigable stream.",5  Be-
cause these two conditions are listed in the conjunctive, it is clear that coun-
ties do not have exclusive jurisdiction over every unincorporated area with-
in its borders. Specifically, its jurisdictions are limited by cities that have
chosen to exercise whatever extra-territorial powers they might have.
In the absence of case law directly on point, the cautious municipal
planner will seek cooperation with county authorities. A planning consultant
for the Arkansas Municipal League advises, "If you choose to extend con-
trol beyond your city limits . . . step carefully. Five miles is way too far. Try
a quarter to a half-mile or, more rationally, only that area that you are sure
will be annexed within the next five to ten years."59 In the absence of go-
verning case law, the cautious course would be to secure the county's ap-
proval, perhaps through intergovernmental agreement or by a resolution of
the quorum court. In any case, a municipality must file extra-territorial
plans with the county clerk" so the county will be on record notice of its
plans. Giving the county prior, actual notice and a chance to give feedback
55. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-14-805(12) (LEXIS Repl. 1998). Counties have their own
enabling statutes, which are practically (if not perfectly) identical to those of municipalities.
Id. § 14-17-201 to - 211 (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
56. See id. § 14-14-805(12) (LEXIS Repl. 1998); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-401
to - 426 (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
57. Id. § 14-17-210 (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
58. Id.
59. JIM VON TUNGELN, ARKANSAS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, PLANNING MADE SIMPLE: A
GUIDE TO PLANNING AND ZONING IN ARKANSAS 21 (2009), available at
http://www.arml.org/pdfs/publications/PlanningMade Simple.pdf.
60. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-422(5) (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
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can bolster intergovernmental relations and may aid in cooperative, com-
prehensive development.
C. Spot & Contract Zoning
Contrary to the Arkansas Supreme Court's willingness to wade into is-
sues created by extra-territorial powers, the court has been reluctant to clari-
fy the Arkansas law on spot zoning. Professor Wright noted that in the case
of Tate v. City of Malvern, the court stated that applicants for spot zoning
bore "an additional burden of proof' when appearing before the city zoning
authority.61 The applicant seeking spot zoning must show that "the charac-
ter of a zoned area has become so changed that a modification is necessary
to promote public health, morals, safety, and welfare; mere economic gain
to [the applicant] is not sufficient." 62 For Wright, the Arkansas formulation
of this rule was strictly at odds with "a cardinal rule of the law of zoning,"
i.e., "'spot zoning' is invalid per se."63 Today, the general rule still holds
that if a particular zoning act amounts to "spot zoning," the act is invalid.64
Due to the usually strict proscription of "spot zoning" and presumably
due to the resulting lack of flexibility to landowners and legislators, spot
zoning analysis has become more complicated. Courts have invalidated as
"spot zoning" any "devotion of a small area within a zoning district to a use
which is inconsistent with the use to which the rest of the district is re-
stricted." 65 In addition, courts have rejected the practice of "contract zon-
ing,"66 a bilateral agreement between a developer and legislative officials
that allows a particular plot to be zoned or rezoned subject to site-specific
conditions on the use of the property. 67 These two concepts are fundamen-
tally related in that they violate the sound policy favoring development
based upon a comprehensive land-use plan. Both involve a single parcel or
small area of land deviating from the larger area's zoning scheme. If this
practice were widely permitted, it would undermine the comprehensive na-
ture of the plan and potentially lead to ad-hoc, piecemeal, parcel-by-parcel
61. Wright, supra note 1, at 443 (citing Tate v. City of Malvern, 246 Ark. 316, 438
S.W.2d 52 (1969)).
62. Tate, 246 Ark. at 321, 438 S.W.2d at 54.
63. Wright, supra note 1, at 442. Wright goes on to state, "contract rezoning is univer-
sally held invalid," but notes that "conditional rezoning has been distinguished from contract
rezoning in a number of jurisdictions" with "conditional rezoning" being valid. Id. at 455.
Today, that semantic distinction is largely meaningless. See 3 RATHKOPF'S, THE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING §§ 1:23, 41:11 (4th ed. 2010).
64. Mark S. Dennison, Annotation, Determination Whether Zoning or Rezoning of
Particular Parcel Constitutes Illegal Spot Zoning, 73 A.L.R.5th 223 (1999).
65. ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE 801 (5th ed. 1997).
66. 3 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 44:1 (4th ed. 2010).
67. Id. at §§ 1:23,41:11.
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zoning. On the other hand, the rigidity of the prohibition of "spot" or "con-
tract" zoning would prohibit flexibility in the development of communities
and place an impossible onus on legislatures to predict whether their current
plans will protect the public welfare in the future.
Given the competing policies, many courts have now chosen to accept
(albeit under different appellations) practices once dubbed "illegal spot zon-
ing" or "contract zoning." Many jurisdictions now accept contract zoning
under the name "conditional zoning." 68 Even in jurisdictions approving of
conditional zoning, rezonings that primarily benefit a private owner rather
than the public health, safety, and welfare are still invalidated as "spot zon-
ing."69 In making the "conditional" or "spot" zoning determination, courts
are particularly concerned with "an express bilateral agreement that bar-
gains away the municipality's future use of the police power." 70 The an-
swers to these questions, whether the zoning primarily benefits the public or
the individual or whether there is a bilateral agreement, used to be irrele-
vant-the action was invalid as illegal spot zoning. Today, the erosion of
this bright line rule encourages results-based decision making masked by
what amounts to a labeling game. When a judge determines that a particu-
lar rezoning is illegal or against public policy, it is called "spot" or "con-
tract" zoning, and if it is permissible in the jurisdiction, it is called "condi-
tional" zoning.
This new majority view of spot zoning, that it is not per se invalid but
that it must further police power goals (whether it is allowed as "condition-
al" or "contract" zoning), seems remarkably similar to the rule developed by
the Arkansas Supreme Court in 1969.71 Although apparently ahead of the
curve, Tate v. City of Malvern7 2 is the most recent pronouncement in Arkan-
sas on the issue. Since then, the court has twice had the opportunity to wade
into the definitional quagmire described above and has declined both times
to do so. 3
In Murphy v. City of West Memphis, 74 the of Arkansas Supreme Court
cited a Florida opinion defining "contract zoning" as "an agreement be-
tween a property owner and a local government where the owner agrees to
certain conditions in return for the government's rezoning or enforceable
68. Id.
69. Id. at § 44:9.
70. Id. at § 44:11.
71. See generally Tate v. City of Malvern, 246 Ark. 316, 438 S.W.2d 52 (1969).
72. 246 Ark. 316, 438 S.W.2d 52 (1969).
73. See PH, LLC v. City of Conway, 2009 Ark. 504, _ S.W.3d _ ; Murphy v.
City of W. Memphis, 352 Ark. 315, 322, 101 S.W.2d 221, 226 (2003).
74. 352 Ark. 315, 101 S.W.2d 221 (2003).
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promise to rezone."75 The Florida court invalidated the rezoning at issue,
stating:
Assuming that the developer and municipality bargain for a re-
zoning ordinance that is fairly debatable and nondiscriminatory,
contract zoning is nevertheless illegal when they enter into a bila-
teral agreement involving reciprocal obligations. By binding it-
self to enact the requested ordinance . . . the municipality by-
76passes the hearing phase of the legislative process.
Strangely, the Murphy court cited no countervailing authority to support the
proposition that some jurisdictions have "found that contracts rezone [sic]
are not prohibited."n Because the court went on to avoid the issue,78 this
omission may well be of little consequence; however, it is interesting that
the court chose to take its definition of "contract zoning" from a case in
which the practice was invalidated.
The most recent opportunity to address this issue occurred in PH, LLC
v. City of Conway.79 In that case, the court reiterated the definition of "con-
tract zoning" used in Murphy without citing any extra-jurisdictional authori-
ty.so As it did in Murphy, the court again refused to consider the argument
at length because the appellant did not show that "there was an agreement to
rezone the property or that it agreed to any conditions proposed by the city
council."81 Clearly, a party intending to challenge contract zoning before
the Arkansas Supreme Court needs to do more than merely allege a quid pro
quo; instead, the actual existence of an agreement between the legislature
and a private party is required to establish contract zoning. Therefore, a
fundamental factual finding must be obtained from the trial court before the
legal issue can be challenged on appeal.82
Perhaps legislative rather than judicial action is needed here. The flex-
ibility and control of the spot-contract-conditional zoning devices offer "a
clear incentive on the part of local officials to substitute 'zoning by negotia-
75. Id. at 322, 101 S.W.2d at 226 (citing Chung v. Sarasota Cnty., 686 So. 2d 1358 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
76. Chung, 686 So. 2d at 1359-60.
77. Murphy, 352 Ark. at 322, 101 S.W.2d at 226.
78. The court declined to address the issue because the challenged ordinances were
enacted prior to the agreement between the private owner and the city and because the trial
court found that the parties had "not entered into any type of binding agreement until the city
council meeting." Id., 101 S.W.2d at 226.
79. 2009 Ark. 504, S.W.3d .
80. Id., S.W.3d
81. Id. at 17, S.W.3dat .
82. See id., S.W.3d at .
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tion' for a well planned and standardized zoning code."83 The "practice of
substituting negotiated conditions in even simple cases" is widespread, 84
and judicial review of the reasonableness of imposed conditions is no subs-
titute for a clear legislative directive from the General Assembly.
D. Conditional-Use Permits85
Unlike conditional zoning, conditional-use permits have been widely
accepted as valid without question. Wright wrote little of conditional-use
permits in 1980 and cited no Arkansas authority regarding this device ex-
cept to note that the City of Little Rock used the permits.8 6 The enabling
statutes make no express reference to conditional-use permits,87 and the
cases dealing with the permits have not considered their legitimacy. De-
spite this lack of technical pedigree, the conditional-use permit is widely
used by cities throughout the state.
No Arkansas appellate court has considered the general validity of
conditional-use permits.89 Arkansas's cities "have no inherent authority to
enact legislation. That authority is dependent upon the Constitution and the
General Assembly."" In 2001, the Attorney General's office issued an opi-
nion indicating that the power to conditionally permit uses comes from sec-
tion 14-56-416(a)(3)(C) of the Arkansas Code that states that zoning ordin-
ances may provide for "compatible uses" and for "such other matters as are
necessary to the health, safety, and general welfare of the municipality."9 1
83. 3 RATHKOPF'S, supra note 66, at § 44:3.
84. Id.
85. Conditional-use permits are also known as "special-use," "special-exception," or
other variations. See Wright, supra note 1, at 452. Conditional-use permit is frequently ab-
breviated "CUP."
86. Wright, supra note 1, at 452-53.
87. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-401 to -426 (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
88. See, e.g., JONESBORO, ARK., CODE § 14.24.01 (2010); FAYETrEVILLE, ARK., CODE §
163.02 (2010); LITrLE ROcK, ARK., CODE § 36-2 (2010).
89. See Mings v. City of Fort Smith, 288 Ark. 42, 701 S.W.2d 705 (1986) (discussing
the nature of conditional-use permits but not their validity); Abram v. City of Fayetteville,
281 Ark. 63, 661 S.W.2d 371 (1983) (applying city's conditional-use ordinance with no
reference to enabling statute); Quapaw Quarter Ass'n Inc. v. City of Little Rock Bd. of Zon-
ing Adjustment, 261 Ark. 74, 546 S.W.2d 427 (1977) (applying city's conditional-use ordin-
ance with no reference to enabling statute); Rolling Pines Ltd. P'ship v. City of Little Rock,
73 Ark. App. 97, 40 S.W.3d 828 (2001) (noting that a conclusion as to the municipality's
statutory authority to issue conditional-use permits is absent from the court's detailed discus-
sion of the device).
90. Brooks v. City of Benton, 308 Ark. 571, 575-76, 826 S.W.2d 259, 261 (1992)
(overturning summary judgment as to whether city enacted zoning legislation through strict
compliance with enabling legislation) (citing City of Fordyce v. Vaughn, 300 Ark. 554, 781
S.W.2d 6 (1989)).
91. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2001-198, 2001 WL 1090599.
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Given that the General Assembly intended readers to construe the enabling
legislation liberally, 92 this seems as good a place as any to find the authority
for cities to regulate conditional uses. Regardless, Arkansas courts have
been reading conditional-use ordinances for decades, Arkansas cities have
been applying them for decades, and they continue to be "quite valuable in
providing flexibility to the decisions of boards or commissions involved in
the zoning process." 93
In fact, the Arkansas Supreme Court recently gave a ringing (albeit in-
cidental) endorsement of the device by upholding a broad "compatibility"
condition.94 Of all of the conditions placed on the issuance of a conditional-
use permit, the single most important condition is "compatibility" with the
surrounding uses. 95 Despite the power to condition use on broad require-
ments such as "compatibility" with the surrounding neighborhood,96 "[a]ny
discretion the commission may have cannot be construed so broadly as to
permit the commission to inject ad hoc requirements at its fancy." 97 Wheth-
er or not ad hoc decision making is strictly permissible, "[o]ver the years,
there has . . . been a proliferation of the land uses made subject to special or
conditional use permits, thereby granting zoning officials the discretion to
consider a proposed use at a particular location on a largely ad hoc basis." 98
Keep these issues in mind as we proceed to the next section.
92. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-401 (LEXIS Repl. 1998) ("This subchapter shall be con-
strued liberally. The enumeration of any object, purpose, power, manner, method, or thing
shall not be deemed to exclude like or similar objects, purposes, powers, manners, methods
or things.").
93. Wright, supra note 1, at 452.
94. See infra notes 106-114 and accompanying text.
95. Wright, supra note 1, at 453 ("In the conditional use permit situation, the uses will
be permitted if, in the discretion of the Planning Commission and the Board, certain condi-
tions have been met - the most important one being that the use in question will not be in-
compatible with the surrounding neighborhood and will not adversely affect the plan for the
area."). See, e.g., FAYETTEVILLE, ARK., CODE § 163.02(C)(3)(c)(ii)(h) (2010) ("The Planning
Commission shall certify: [8 conditions, the last being] General compatibility with adjacent
properties and other property in the district.").
96. See, e.g., EUREKA SPRINGS, ARK., CODE § 14.08.08(E)(2) (2010) ("The Planning
Commission shall either grant or deny the Conditional Use Permit within a reasonable time
of the final public hearing, imposing such conditions, if any, deemed necessary and appropri-
ate to protect the character of the neighborhood.").
97. Richardson v. City of Little Rock Planning Comm'n, 295 Ark. 189, 193-94, 747
S.W.2d 116, 118 (1988) (Glaze, J., concurring) (reversing denial of plat where planning
commission required more than the fixed standards located in the city's subdivision code).
Although Richardson does not address the conditional-use permit situation, which involves
substantially more discretion than plat issuance, there is no reason to believe that ad hoc
administrative or quasi-judicial decision making is either desirable or permissible in Arkan-
sas.
98. 1 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1:14 (4th ed. 2010).
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E. Planned-Unit Developments9
Planned-Unit Developments (PUD) provide "more intensive site-
specific control and design review of future land development" than do
conditional-use permits or any other currently employed land-use device. 100
In 1980, "the PUD [had] never been challenged in Arkansas," even though
"[w]hen the Arkansas enabling act was passed in 1957, the PUD concept
was either non-existent or existed only in the theories of a few urban plan-
ners or architects."'01 Professor Wright read the statutes as "silent with re-
gard to the PUD"; however, he believed "[t]he intent of the enabling act ...
would appear to permit such devices."' 0 2 Whether the enabling statutes
allow for PUDs remains an open question, as Arkansas appellate courts
have yet to directly address it. Like conditional-use permits, however,
PUDs are used throughout the state. 10 3 I am more confident today, than was
Professor Wright in 1980, that courts would uphold the PUD as a valid ex-
ercise of municipal zoning power.
First, unlike Professor Wright, I find a clear textual source for PUDs in
the enabling statutes. The statute empowering planning commissions to
prepare zoning ordinances states, "The ordinance may provide for districts,
of compatible uses, for large scale unified development, for elimination of
uses not in conformance with provisions of the ordinance, and for such oth-
er matters as are necessary to the health, safety, and general welfare of the
municipality."1" This is the same statute that the Attorney General's office
interprets as providing a textual basis for conditional-use permits.'0o Al-
though the specific mechanics of the PUD did not exist at the time the sta-
tute was drafted, the idea of a comprehensively planned community clearly
existed. The phrase "large scale unified development" not only describes a
well-implemented PUD, but it is also a synonym in many ordinances. 06
Construing this language liberally, as the drafters intended,107 a court could
99. Planned-use developments are alternately referred to as "large-scale developments"
and "planned-use developments." Stromwall v. City of Springdale Planning Comm'n, 350
Ark. 281, 86 S.W.3d 844 (2002); see also PH, LLC v. City of Conway, 2009 Ark. 504,
S.W.3d .
100. 1 RATHKOPF'S, supra note 98, at § 1:11.
101. Wright, supra note 1, at 459.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., SPRINGDALE, ARK., CODE § 130.6.5 (2010); HOT SPRINGS, ARK., CODE §
16-247 (2010); PINE BLUFF, ARK., CODE § 29-107 (2010).
104. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-416(a)(3)(C) (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
105. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
107. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-401 (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
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hardly say that the PUD was not a "like or similar . . . method" to those
enumerated. 08
The Arkansas Supreme Court has yet to directly endorse the PUD, but
it may as well have in Benton County Stone v. Benton County Planning
Board.'09 In that case, the court held that a large-scale site plan ordinance
based on the term "compatibility" was not constitutionally void for vague-
ness because the term "compatibility" has a dictionary definition."o Specif-
ically, the "compatibility term" of the ordinance stated that the development
"[m]ust be consistent and compatible with existing development and the
environment."' The court went on to note that "[c]ommercial and indus-
trial developments are encouraged to cluster to minimize incompatible land-
use, [that] [a]ny industrial and commercial development(s) that could limit
the viability of existing agricultural uses are discouraged [and that]
[r]esidential development that could limit the viability of existing commer-
cial and industrial operations are discouraged."ll 2
As foreshadowed in the conditional-use permit discussion, this deci-
sion affects both PUDs and conditional-use permits, because both rely heav-
ily on the "compatibility" test. In deciding Benton County Stone, the court
looked to an Arkansas Appeals Court decision, Rolling Pines Ltd. Partner-
ship v. City ofLittle Rock.'13 The earlier case revolved around the denial of
a conditional-use permit, and the court held that "'compatible' had a well-
defined meaning and was not so vague as to leave an applicant guessing as
to its import or meaning."ll 4 In support, the court cited an Oregon Court of
Appeals case that the Benton County Stone court also cited with the follow-
ing explanatory parenthetical: "(holding that the word compatible was not
impermissibly vague because it has a plain and ordinary meaning that could
be readily understood by reference to a dictionary).""'5 To prove that the
term "compatible" is not vague, the Benton County Stone court went on to
cite the Oxford English Dictionary and the American Heritage College Dic-
tionary."6 Finally, the court concluded that because "compatible" is not
108. Id. § 14-56-425 (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
109. 374 Ark. 519, 288 S.W.3d 653 (2008).
110. Id. at 522-26, 288 S.W.3d at 655-58.
111. Id at 522, 288 S.W.3d at 655, 657.
112. Id. at 523, 288 S.W.3d at 655.
113. Id. at 523-24, 288 S.W.3d at 656-58 (citing Rolling Pines Ltd. P'ship v. City of
Little Rock, 73 Ark. App. 97, 40 S.W.3d 828 (2001)).
114. Id. at 525, 288 S.W.3d at 657 (citing Rolling Pines Ltd. P'ship v. City of Little
Rock, 73 Ark. App. 97,40 S.W.3d 828 (2001)).
115. Benton Cnty. Stone, 374 Ark. at 525, 288 S.W.3d at 657.
116. Id., 288 S.W.3d at 657. The dictionaries provide the following definitions: "mutual-
ly tolerant; capable of being admitted together, or of existing together in the same subject;
accordant, consistent, congruous, agreeable" and "capable of existing or performing in har-
monious, agreeable, or congenial combination." Id., 288 S.W.3d at 657.
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unconstitutionally vague, it served as a proper "discretionary restraint" un-
der which the planning board acted to deny the permit."' Whether the void-
for-vagueness doctrine has any future in Arkansas is a question for another
time, but the Benton County Stone case leaves little doubt that PUDs are
safe.
Despite the sweeping discretion of which the Benton County Stone
case approves, a city's use of PUDs is limited by the legislatively enacted
ordinance that authorizes them; i.e., the Planning Commission (a non-
legislative body)"' lacks the unbridled discretion to permit or deny the de-
velopment of PUDs. In City of Little Rock, Arkansas v. Pfeifer,"9 the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's grant of summary judg-
ment, which effectively denied the rezoning of land to a planned commer-
cial district.120 The court reaffirmed that once a city "creates a zoning or-
dinance or a land use plan or adopt[s] planned use districts or planned
commercial districts . . . it must follow the ordinance until it is repealed or
altered."' 2' Little Rock's fatal error in that case was to rezone the subject
property to a PUD, while failing to amend the definitional requirements of a
PUD.122 At the time, the Little Rock ordinance recognized four permissible
uses for a PUD: public institutional uses, office uses, industrial uses, and
retail commercial uses.' 23 Furthermore, the purpose of the PUD was to ac-
commodate "mixed use developments combining residential, commercial
and office uses in a carefully planned configuration." 24 Unfortunately, the
rezoning accommodated a wholesale rather than a retail use that did not
include mixed developments. 12 Since the rezoning ordinance was at odds
with the definitional requirements of its predicate enabling ordinance, the
rezoning ordinance failed.12 6
That ruling seems in line with the general rule that cities must substan-
tially comply with the enabling statues and their own ordinances.1 In or-
der to ensure the maximum flexibility and enforceability of a PUD ordin-
ance, it appears that vague standards like "compatibility" are more favora-
bly viewed than strict, easy-to-apply lists of uses. If the standards are max-
imally flexible and broad, a city will be more likely to "substantially comp-
117. Id at 526, 288 S.W.3d at 657.
118. See infra Part 111.
119. 318 Ark. 679, 887 S.W.2d 296 (1994).
120. Id. at 679, 887 S.W.2d at 296.
121. Id at 683, 887 S.W.2d at 298.
122. Id at 685-86, 887 S.W.2d at 299.
123. Id at 685, 887 S.W.2d at 299.
124. Id, 887 S.W.2d at 299.
125. Pfeifer, 318 Ark. at 685-86, 887 S.W.2d at 299.
126. Id., 887 S.W.2d at 299.
127. See City of Coming v. Watson, 252 Ark. 1277, 482 S.W.2d 797 (1972). See gener-
ally Potocki v. City of Fort Smith, 279 Ark. 19, 648 S.W.2d 462 (1983).
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ly" with its own standards because compliance with ambiguous standards is
easier. By contrast, clear and narrow standards are more likely to discou-
rage substantial compliance by restricting the city's decision-making power
and encouraging deviation.
F. A Belated Wake for the Pfeifer Rule
The Pfeifer rule has nothing to do with the previously cited case deal-
ing with PUDs; instead, it comes from the identically styled case of City of
Little Rock v. Pfeiferl2 8 decided in 1925. Generally, the rule was that "any
attempt on the part of the city council to restrict the growth of an established
business district is arbitrary." 29 The effect of that statement was to create a
categorical right to rezone property adjacent to a commercially-zoned lot for
commercial purposes: "When a business district has been rightly estab-
lished, the rights of owners of property adjacent thereto cannot be restricted
so as to prevent them from using it as business property."130  Professor
Wright justifiably condemned the rule as "arbitrary [and] contrary to com-
prehensive planning."' 3 ' In 1980, he declared, "the Pfeifer rule is dead; but
also in reality it is not buried. Lawyers and chancellors alike continue to
invoke it."l 32
Today, Pfeifer is dead, buried and long forgotten. At last, in 1996, the
Arkansas Supreme Court announced:
There was an aberration in our case law, which is set out only to
show that it existed and that it has ended. Shortly after we correct-
ly decided the foundation case of Herring v. Stannus, we de-
cided City of Little Rock v. Pfeifer, and in essence, held that the
128. 169 Ark. 1027, 277 S.W. 883 (1925).
129. Id. at 1029, 277 S.W. at 885.
130. Id., 277 S.W. at 885. For additional application of the rule, see City of W. Helena v.
Davidson, 250 Ark. 257, 464 S.W.2d 581 (1971). After the majority upheld the chancellor's
decision to reverse the planning commission's denial of rezoning, the dissent made the fol-
lowing observation of the chancellor's findings of fact:
[H]e stated that, in consideration of the testimony in trying to analyze the proof,
he had taken into consideration his own opinions formed by a visit to the area
during a month's sojourn in the city in the trial of other litigation and had
viewed the premises and noted the activity of the bowling alley, the warehouse
and office building of the Arkansas Power and Light Company and the Dairy
Queen in the immediate area as well as the commercial activity on the south
side of the highway as it proceeds into the City of Helena. He stated that, in his
opinion, the area is highly commercial regardless of how the defendant may
zone the area.
Id. at 271-72, 464 S.W.2d at 588 (Fogleman, J., dissenting).
131. Wright, supra note 1, at 471.
132. Id. at 478.
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review of zoning appeals could be by trial de novo rather than by
solely determining whether the enactment by the legislative
branch was arbitrary. The effect was to judge the wisdom of the
enactment in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. We
began to retreat from the Pfeifer doctrine in the 1953 case
of Evans v. City of Little Rock, and backed further away from it in
the 1966 cases of Downs v. City of Little Rock and City of Little
Rock v. Parker. The Pfeifer doctrine led to criticism. Morton Gi-
telman, Judicial Review of Zoning in Arkansas; Morton Gitel-
man, Zoning-The Expanding Business District Doctrine in Arkan-
sas: An Obstacle to Land Use Planning. In Baldridge v. City of
North Little Rock, we re-examined the Pfeifer doctrine and almost
laid it to rest. See Robert R. Wright, Zoning Law in Arkansas. Fi-
nally, in City of Little Rock v. Breeding, we noted the many cases
that "restricted, limited and modified the holding in Pfeifer," and
said the case now has "little if any validity." In summary, we have
returned to the foundational doctrine of Herring v. Stannus, which
provides that the judicial department can set aside a legislative
enactment only when the legislative branch has abused its discre-
tion in an enactment because of arbitrariness.' 33
Like the court, I mention the "aberration" only to note that it once ex-
isted and that it does no longer. The farther knowledge of its death spreads,
the less likely its resurrection.
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE NATURE OF LAND-USE DECISIONS
The powers of the government of the State ofArkansas shall be divided
into three distinct departments, each of them to be confided to a separate
body of magistracy, to-wit: Those which are legislative, to one, those which
are executive, to another, and those which are judicial, to another. 134
Since the General Assembly enacted the enabling act, Arkansas Code
section 14-56-425 has been the gate-keeping mechanism for the review of
land-use decisions in Arkansas.135 Because that section expressly distin-
133. City of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, Inc., 323 Ark. 332, 337-38, 916
S.W.2d 95, 98 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
134. ARK. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
135. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-425 (LEXIS Repl. 1998). While this part parses only
a portion of the statute, Part IV, infra, deals with the remaining language. The full statute
states:
In addition to any remedy provided by law, appeals from final action taken by
the administrative and quasi-judicial agencies concerned in the administration
of this subchapter may be taken to the circuit court of the appropriate county
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guishes between types of governmental power'3 6 and because aphorisms of
judicial self-restraint caution against the creation of "super zoning commis-
sions,"' 37 the past three decades have seen a significant amount of litigation
dedicated to the categorization of government action. Both sides of the liti-
gation aisle have contested the coloring of official acts, because courts are
required to give differing levels of deference to different types of official
conduct. While the purpose of Part II was to look at the actual substantive
law of land use, the purpose of this part is to analyze the structure within
which that law is created. In other words, this part is concerned with the
nature of the various land-use related aspects of the municipal decision-
making process.
The statute creates essentially two classes of governmental decisions:
decisions governed by the statute (administrative and quasi-judicial) and
decisions not governed by the statute (legislative).138 Beyond application of
the immediate statute, one of the fundamental aspects of our republican
form of government is that certain bodies are empowered to make certain
types of decisions; therefore, these issues are important not only to the liti-
gator but also to those counseling or appearing before land-use officials. To
aid in the understanding of the decision-making process, Part III is divided
into two sections to discuss both statutory classes. The first section is con-
cerned with administrative and quasi-judicial powers and the second with
legislative power.
A. Watching the Watchmen: Administrative & Quasi-Judicial
"Deference"
This section is divided into three different, yet related questions about
administrative and quasi-judicial decisions. The first deals with defining
and identifying administrative and quasi-judicial land-use decisions. The
second identifies the government actors capable of engaging in those sorts
of decisions. The third looks to the level of judicial deference paid to the
decision.
where they shall be tried de novo according to the same procedure which ap-
plies to appeals in civil actions from decisions of inferior courts, including the
right of trial byjury.
Id.
136. Id.
137. Smith v. City of Little Rock, 279 Ark. 4, 8, 648 S.W.2d 454, 456 (1983); City of
Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 453, 619 S.W.2d 664, 672 (1981); City of Conway v.
Hous. Auth. of City of Conway, 266 Ark. 404, 409, 584 S.W.2d 10, 13 (1979).
138. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-425 (LEXIS Repl. 1998) (subjecting administrative and
quasi-judicial decisions to de novo review).
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1. What are "Administrative" & "Quasi-Judicial" Decisions?
First, note that "administrative" and "quasi-judicial" are not necessari-
ly synonymous. Prior to 1971, the appeals statute, section 14-56-425 (then
19-2830.1), read "administrative, quasi judicial, and legislative."l 3 9 The
appeals statute for county land-use decisions still uses this formulation. 140
In 1971, the Arkansas Supreme Court declared the de novo review of a
city's legislative action to be unconstitutional, 14 ' and as a result, today's
municipal statute includes only the terms "administrative and quasi-
judicial."1 4 2 Arkansas courts construe statutes "so that no word is void, su-
perfluous or insignificant and meaning and effect must be given to every
word contained therein, if possible," 4 3 and because one of the three listed
types of governmental action is so fundamentally different than the other
two that it deserves constitutionally mandated deference, it stands to reason
that the General Assembly did not intentionally list two synonyms and one
unrelated word in a list of three.'44 Reading the words synonymously would
result in rendering one or the other (either "administrative" or "quasi-
judicial") mere repetitious surplusage.
Despite this clear rule of statutory construction, no Arkansas appellate
court has distinguished between the two. The reason for this is simple and
practical: they have no need to do so. Both "administrative" and "quasi-
judicial" decisions are subject to de novo review;145 therefore, litigants and
courts have been unconcerned with the difference between these two types
of government action-either way, de novo review is used. When and why
this distinction matters is fully addressed in the next subsection,146 but for
now we are concerned with the fact that "administrative" action differs from
"quasi-judicial" action and with the contours of that difference.
Administrative action involves little-to-no discretion. The word "mi-
nisterial" is often used as a synonym for "administrative," and they can be
139. See Wenderoth v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 344, 472 S.W.2d 74, 75 (1971).
140. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-17-211 (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
141. Wenderoth, 251 Ark. at 344, 472 S.W.2d at 75.
142. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-17-425 (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
143. See Locke v. Cook, 245 Ark. 787, 793, 434 S.W.2d 598, 601 (1968); see also Mi-
chael W. Mullane, Statutory Interpretation in Arkansas: How Should a Statute Be Read?
When Is It Subject to Interpretation? What Our Courts Say and What They Do, 2004 ARK. L.
NOTES 85, 87 (2004) ("[I]t is presumed that no word or phrase is mere surplusage.").
144. The logic of this argument survives the statutory revisions removing the term "legis-
lative." It would be equally wrong to assume that the legislature intended to repeat itself if
either "administrative" or "quasi-judicial" would alone be sufficient to effectuate the intent
of lawmakers.
145. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-425 (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
146. See infra Part Ill. A.2.
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used interchangeably.147 "Ministerial" is an adjective "relating to an act that
involves obedience to instructions or laws instead of discretion, judgment,
or skill."l48 Arkansas courts have often equated these terms in other con-
texts. 149
An example of a purely administrative land-use decision is the approv-
al of a preliminary plat. The Arkansas Supreme Court held: "When a sub-
division ordinance specifies minimum standards to which a preliminary plat
must conform, it is arbitrary as a matter of law to deny approval of a plat
that meets those standards."150 The court held that the planning commission
acts in "an administrative capacity" when it performs this function, and that
the planning commission had "no discretionary power" to disapprove the
preliminary plat.' 5 1 Following this logic, the issuance of use permits must
also fall into this category in Arkansas. 152
As opposed to plats and permits, an obvious example of quasi-judicial
decision making occurs when a landowner applies to the board of zoning
adjustments for a variance. The term "quasi-judicial" applies to acts by
agencies or officers who are empowered to investigate facts, to weigh evi-
dence, to draw conclusions as a basis for official actions, and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature. 153 Boards of zoning adjustments should issue
variances when "strict enforcement of [a land-use] ordinance would cause
undue hardship due to circumstances unique to the individual property un-
der consideration."1 54 The very essence of the variance device is to provide
147. 63C Am. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 21 (2010).
148. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2004).
149. See, e.g., Kelly v. Miss. Cnty. Cir. Ct., 374 Ark. 396, 398, 288 S.W.3d 243, 244
(2008) ("[A]fter his own recusal ... in his role as an administrative judge, the ministerial act
of assigning another judge to the case."); City of Dardanelle v. City of Russellville, 372 Ark.
486, 490, 277 S.W.3d 562, 565 (2008) ("This is especially true when applicable to ministeri-
al acts, or administrative business of a municipality."); Paragould Cablevision Inc. v. City of
Paragould, 305 Ark. 476, 485, 809 S.W.2d 688, 693 (1991) ("[T]he powers to be exercised
by the Commission are not legislative powers, but rather administrative or ministerial pow-
ers.").
150. Richardson v. City of Little Rock Planning Comm'n, 295 Ark. 189, 191-92, 747
S.W.2d 116, 117 (1988) (citing Odell v. City of Eagan, 348 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984).
151. Id. at 191-92, 747 S.W.2d at 117.
152. Although no Arkansas authority exists on point, the majority of jurisdictions find
that permitting is an administrative function, even when the permitting agency is the legisla-
ture.
Assuming an appropriate enabling statute, a municipal legislative authority may specifi-
cally retain authority to issue permits by spelling out such a reservation in the zoning ordin-
ance. When permit issuing authority is retained by the legislature, the granting or denial of
special permits by that body is regarded by most courts as an administrative rather than a
legislative function. 2 AM. LAW ZONING § 14:10 (5th ed. 2010).
153. 73 C.J.S. Public Admin. Law and Proc. § 16 (2004).
154. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-416(b)(2)(B)(i)(a) (LEXIS Repl. 1998). In Arkansas,
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flexibility and discretion to avoid unduly harsh application of land-use regu-
lation. 15
The Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized the quasi-judicial nature
of variances. In City of Fort Smith v. McCutchen,15 6 the court said, "[I]t is
clear that the Fort Smith BZA [board of zoning adjustments] was acting in
an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial manner when it denied McCutchen's va-
riance request."' 57 In that case, the landowner added a carport to his home
in violation of a thirty-foot setback requirement without first seeking a va-
riance.1 18 The board of zoning adjustments found no hardship and denied
the permit.'59 Pursuant to section 14-56-425 of the Arkansas Code, the lan-
downer appealed to the circuit court and sought a jury trial.o60 After the jury
reversed the decision of the board of zoning adjustments, Fort Smith's sole
argument on appeal was that section 14-56-425 of the Arkansas Code did
not apply because the variance decision was "legislative." 16' Therefore, the
court's determination that the variance device was quasi-judicial in nature
and subsequently subject to the requirements of section 14-56-425 was the
central holding of the case.
2. What Land-Use Authorities Make Administrative & Quasi-
Judicial Decisions?
The differences between the two types of action articulated above-
administrative and quasi-judicial-only matter to land-use officials and
those appearing before quasi-judicial or administrative land-use agencies.
A circuit court or a jury is required to review either decision de novo.16 2
This section, therefore, is primarily concerned with the pre-litigation aspects
of land-use proceedings, specifically which land-use officials are empo-
wered to make which types of decisions. First, we will deal with "adminis-
trative" decisions and then with "quasi-judicial."
In the enabling legislation, the adjective "administrative" is used twice
outside of section 14-56-425, and both usages appear in the context of offi-
variances apply only to structures or "area" and do not permit nonconforming uses. Id. § 14-
56-416(b)(2)(B); Wright, supra note 1, at 448-49.
155. See Wright, supra note 1, at 448 ("The United States Supreme Court decision in
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. would surely have been different except for the fact that the
ordinance provided for some amelioration of the seeming harshness of the zoning being
imposed.").
156. 372 Ark. 541, 279 S.W.3d 78 (2008).
157. Id. at 546-47, 279 S.W.3d at 83.
158. Id. at 542, 279 S.W.3d at 79-80.
159. Id, 279 SW.3d at 79-80.
160. Id. at 542-43, 279 S.W.3d at 80.
161. Id at 543, 279 S.W.3d at 80.
162. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-425 (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
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cial decisions appealed to the BZA.'6 3 The statute first states that the func-
tion of the BZA is to "[h]ear appeals from the decision of the administrative
officers in respect to the enforcement and application of the ordinance, and
may affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the decision of the administrative
officer."' Since "administrative" is used synonymously with "ministeri-
al," it makes sense that individual officers act in a purely administrative
capacity.
Administrative decisions are made not only by individual officers, but
also by collective entities such as boards and commissions. For instance, in
Richardson v. City of Little Rock Planning Commission,165 the court found
that the planning commission, acting as a body, engaged in an administra-
tive task when it reviewed a preliminary plat.'66 Even the governing body
of a city can make administrative determinations when its action constitutes
an "application of its zoning regulations rather than . . . [an] enactment of
them." 67
As opposed to administrative decisions, there is no authority that al-
lows an individual actor to make a quasi-judicial land-use determination.
The enabling statutes expressly list only one quasi-judicial device: the va-
riance. 168 That device must be issued by either the BZA or the city's go-
verning body.169 Likewise, assuming the conditional-use permit falls into
the "quasi-judicial" category (the Arkansas Supreme Court has not affirma-
tively made that determination), only the planning commission or city coun-
cil may issue one.170 Individuals, therefore, have no quasi-judicial authori-
ty, whereas commissions, boards, and councils do.
163. Id. § 14-56-416(b)(2)(A).
164. Id. § 14-56-416(b)(2)(B)(i) (listing the "variance," but not specifically identifying it
as "quasi-judicial").
165. 295 Ark. 189, 747 S.W.2d 116 (1988).
166. Id. at 191-92, 747 S.W.2dat 117.
167. City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 371, 837 S.W.2d 286, 288 (1992).
In a series of cases, the court has applied section 14-56-425 of the Arkansas Code and Dis-
trict Court Rule 9 to the resolutions of city councils acting to condemn property. Talley v.
City of N. Little Rock, 2009 Ark. 601, _ S.W.3d _; Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224,
309 S.W.3d 179 (2009); Ingram v. City of Pine Bluff, 355 Ark. 129, 133 S.W.3d 382 (2003).
Resolutions are the specific mechanisms through which legislatures act administratively. 5
MCQUILLIN ON MUN. CORP. § 15:2 (3d ed. 2009).
168. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-416(b) (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
169. "The board [of zoning adjustment] shall have the following functions: . . . hear
request for variances." ARK. CODE ANN. §14-56-416(b)(2)(B)(i)(a); See Miller v. City of
Lake City, 302 Ark. 267, 789 S.W.2d 440 (1990), where an unchallenged ordinance did not
provide for a board of zoning adjustment but allowed only the city council to issue variances.
170. See Mings v. City of Fort Smith, 288 Ark. 42, 47-48, 701 S.W.2d 705, 708 (1986)
("There is not complete agreement about whether issuance of a conditional use permit is a
legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial function. As appeals from the planning com-
mission go to the city's legislative body, the board of directors, perhaps it should be a legisla-
tive matter . . . . [W]e should recognize that basic land use planning is a legislative function
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3. How Do Courts Treat These Decisions?
As the answer to this question has already been repeated almost ad
nauseum, this section will be brief. The enabling statutes require de novo
review of quasi-judicial and administrative decisions.171 This includes the
right to a jury trial.17 2 This also means that the records of the administrative
or quasi-judicial proceedings are largely irrelevantl7 3 because the judge or
jury will hear the evidence anew and may even hear evidence that was not
presented at the hearing. 174
This zero-deference standard of review is not the norm in other states
or even in our own. Most state courts review administrative and quasi-
judicial zoning decisions to determine whether they are based on "substan-
tial evidence."' Coincidentally, Arkansas appellate courts apply this stan-
dard when reviewing the decisions of the trial court in land-use cases.176
Compared to other quasi-judicial and administrative agencies in our own
state, the standard of deference is also unusually low. Most of the time, an
Arkansas "appellate court's review is directed, not toward the circuit court,
but toward the decision of the agency, because administrative agencies are
better equipped by specialization, insight through experience, and more
flexible procedures than courts, to determine and analyze legal issues affect-
ing their agencies." 7 7 Furthermore, the appellate court upholds the admin-
istrative decisions "if they are supported by substantial evidence and are not
arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion." 78  The
in which we should interfere only when necessary."). But see Rolling Pines Ltd. P'ship v.
City of Little Rock, 73 Ark. App. 97, 104, 40 S.W.3d 828, 833 (2001) (opining, in obiter
dictum, that "[conditional-use permits] may be issued when the appropriate municipal agen-
cy finds that certain conditions . .. have been satisfied. That determination involves the
exercise of discretion and necessitates a quasi-administrative or quasi-judicial considera-
tion.").
171. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-425 (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
172. Id.; see also City of Fort Smith v. McCutchen, 372 Ark. 541, 542, 279 S.W.3d 78,
79 (2008).
173. See David Newbern, Zoning Flexibility: Bored of Adjustment?, 30 ARK. L. REV.
491, 503 (1977).
174. See Carmical v. McAfee, 68 Ark. App. 313, 326, 7 S.W.3d 350, 259 (1999) ("Pur-
suant to [section 14-56-425], 'appeals' to circuit court are not limited proceedings where the
circuit court merely conducts a substantial-evidence review but, instead, are trials de novo.").
175. 3 RATHKOPF'S, supra note 66, at § 62:42.
176. See Quapaw Quarter Ass'n Inc. v. City of Little Rock Bd. of Zoning Adjustment,
261 Ark. 74, 77, 546 S.W.2d 427, 429 (1977); City of Little Rock v. Kaufinan, 249 Ark. 530,
532, 460 S.W.2d 88, 89 (1970).
177. Collie v. Ark. State Med. Bd., 370 Ark. 180, 183, 258 S.W.3d 367, 370 (2007)
(citing Batiste v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 361 Ark. 46, 204 S.W.3d 521 (2005); Ford
Motor Co. v. Ark. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 357 Ark. 125, 161 S.W.3d 788 (2004)).
178. Id., 258 S.W.3d at 370 (citing Pine Bluff for Safe Disposal v. Ark. Pollution Control
& Ecology Comm'n, 354 Ark. 563, 127 S.W.3d 509 (2003)).
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General Assembly apparently did not feel that local land-use agencies war-
ranted the same deference. 179
B. Resolving the Countermajoritarian Difficulty?: Legislative
Deference'80
This section asks and answers three questions. First, it defines and
gives examples of legislative decisions. Second, it identifies the land-use
authorities empowered to engage in legislative decision making. Third, it
discusses the level of deference Arkansas courts give to these decisions.
1. What Are "Legislative" Decisions?
The quintessential land-use "legislation" is the enactment of zoning
ordinances and subdivision regulations. In the referendum context, the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court has determined that "[t]he crucial test for determin-
ing what is legislative and what is administrative is whether the ordinance is
one making a new law, or one executing a law already in existence."' 8 1
"The legislative power includes discretion to determine the interests of the
public as well as the means necessary to protect those interests."l82 The
enabling statutes require that all ordinances and regulations be adopted by
the city council.'83 Normally, rezoning and other amendments to the ordin-
ance must follow the same procedures as is required for the adoption of the
original ordinances and regulations;' " however, if the original ordinance so
provides, amendments (including rezoning) may be accomplished by a sim-
ple majority vote of the city council.'"
179. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-425 (LEXIS Repl. 1998) (mandating de novo review).
For a possible "reason," see infra note 201.
180. The "Countermajoritarian Difficulty" is a phrase describing the tensions between
two competing values of our republican form of government. It
serves as shorthand for the problem of reconciling judicial review with popular
governance in a democratic society. The problem is this: to the extent that de-
mocracy entails responsiveness to popular will, how to explain a branch of gov-
ernment whose members are unaccountable to the people, yet have the power to
overturn popular decisions?
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to
Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333, 335 (1998).
181. Scroggins v. Kerr, 217 Ark. 137, 143, 228 S.W.2d 995, 999 (1950) (citing I
MCQUILLIN, MUN. CORPORATIONS § 1000 (2d ed. 1940). The same language was quoted
recently in PH, LLC v. City of Conway, 2009 Ark. 504, S.W.3d _, _ .
182. City of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, Inc., 323 Ark. 332, 336, 916 S.W.2d
95, 97 (1996).
183. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-422(3)-(5) (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
184. Id § 14-56-423.
185. Id; City of Russellville v. Banner Real Estate, 326 Ark. 673, 676, 933 S.W.2d 803,
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Until very recently, the nature of rezoning has posed something of a
problem for the courts. Two turn-of-the-century cases took the completely
novel view that a vote to deny rezoning was administrative while a vote to
approve rezoning was legislative.' 86 The problem was created by the first
case-Camden Community Development Corp. v. Sutton.187 There the court
was in such a hurry to deny voters their state constitutional right to initia-
tive'88 that it completely misread precedent, determining that Wenderoth v.
City of Fort Smith (the case that carved legislative rezones out of the ambit
of de novo review under section 14-56-425)89 had nothing to do with a
determination as to the legislative nature of the rezoning act.
In Summit Mall Company, LLC v. Lemond,'9' the court took a step
back from Camden in another case concerned with the initiative-referendum
power of the people under Amendment VII. The court stated, "Because the
City Board [in Camden] failed to pass any ordinance, it obviously did not
act legislatively . . .. Here, by enacting Ordinance No. 18,456 in 2001 ...
the Board took legislative action which is a power delegated to it by the
General Assembly."l 92 This allowed Justice Clinton Imber to concur (she
dissented strongly in Camden);'93 however, she throttled the opinion be-
cause of "the dichotomy created by the majority's attempt to distinguish
Camden" and the fact that the court had "effectively bifurcated the people's
power under Amendment 7.. ."194
805 (1996) (holding that "§ 14-56-423 [was] controlling, and it permit[ted] a change in the
zoning plan, or rezoning, by 'majority vote of the city council' without following the proce-
dure requiring further planning commission review as prescribed in § 14-56422"); Taggart
& Taggart Seed Co. v. City of Augusta, 278 Ark. 570, 573, 647 S.W.2d 458, 459 (1983)
(noting that where a city's ordinance does not "provide for the alternative method of amend-
ment of boundaries, but, instead, provides for amendment only through the complete plan-
ning procedure[, the] choice of procedures does not conflict with the enabling statute for it
simply continues to authorize the more extensive planning procedure"); see also Smith Auto
Salvage v. City of Pine Bluff, 2002 Ark. App., 2002 WL 432808, at *1 (unpublished).
186. Summit Mall Co., LLC v. Lemond, 355 Ark. 190, 201-02, 132 S.W.3d 725, 732
(2003) (holding the enactment of a rezoning ordinance to be legislative); Camden Cmty.
Dev. Corp. v. Sutton, 339 Ark. 368, 373-74, 5 S.W.3d 439, 442 (1999) (holding the failure
to enact a rezoning ordinance to be administrative), overruled by PH, LLC v. City of Con-
way, 2009 Ark. 504, S.W.3d _.
187. 339 Ark. 368,5 S.W.3d 439 (1999).
188. See ARK. CONST. amend. VII; PH, LLC, 2009 Ark. at , S.W.3d at (ex-
plicitly overruling Camden Cmty. Dev. Corp.).
189. See generally Wenderoth v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74
(1971).
190. Camden Cmly. Dev. Corp., 339 Ark. at 374, 5 S.W.3d at 442.
191. 335 Ark. 190, 132 S.W.3d 725 (2003).
192. Id. at 200-01, 132 S.W.3d at 731-32.
193. Camden Cmty. Dev. Corp., 339 Ark. at 376, 5 S.W.3d at 444 (Clinton Imber, J.,
dissenting).
194. Summit Mall Co., 355 Ark. at 213, 132 S.W.3d at 740 (Clinton Imber, J., concur-
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In 2009, Justice Brown (author of the Summit Mall opinion) penned the
unanimous opinion of the court in PH, LLC v. City of Conway. There, the
court explicitly overruled Camden and held that "zoning decisions, whether
grants or denials, are legislative in nature."l 9 5 Since zoning and rezoning
create new law rather than execute existing law, this is undeniably the cor-
rect result.
2. What Land- Use Authorities Make Legislative Decisions?
Only the governing body of the municipality has the power to make
legislative decisions. Although not all decisions of the governing body are
legislative,1 96 the power to legislate is vested in the governing body, and
"exclusively" legislative power cannot be delegated. 197 The Arkansas Su-
preme Court has clearly articulated that "[t]he Planning Commission, sitting
as a Board of Adjustment has no power to legislate."' 98 Not surprisingly, no
authority exists approving of individual officials making legislative deter-
minations.
3. How Do Arkansas Courts Treat These Decisions?
As opposed to the de novo review afforded quasi-judicial and adminis-
trative decisions, legislative decisions receive tremendous deference. First,
remember that "when a municipality acts in a legislative capacity, it exer-
cises a power conferred upon it by the General Assembly, and consequently,
an act of a municipality is the co-equal of an act of the General Assem-
bly." 9 9 Beyond that statement, Arkansas courts have used various formula-
tions of "rational basis" review as indicated by the following phrases:
"[T]he application of the appropriate restraint on judicial action in these
cases requires that the courts refuse to act unless no reasonable mind could
reach the conclusion reached by the city council"; 2 00 "A chancery court may
ring).
195. PH, LLC v. City of Conway, 2009 Ark. 504, S.W.3d _.
196. See, e.g., City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 371, 837 S.W.2d 286, 288
(1992).
197. Clinton v. Clinton, 305 Ark. 585, 591, 810 S.W.2d 923, 926-27 (1991); Walden v.
Hart, 243 Ark 650, 420 S.W.2d 868 (1967). The General Assembly illegally delegated the
authority to decide what constituted fire, police, and emergency vehicles to city commission-
ers and police chiefs without legislative guidance.
198. McCammon v. Boyer, 285 Ark. 288, 292, 686 S.W.2d 421, 424 (1985) (quoted in
City of Fort Smith v. McCutchen, 372 Ark. 541, 546, 279 S.W.3d 78, 82 (2008)).
199. City of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, Inc., 323 Ark. 332, 336, 916 S.W.2d
95, 97 (1996).
200. City of Blytheville v. Thompson, 254 Ark. 46, 58, 491 S.W.2d 769, 775 (1973)
(Fogleman, J., dissenting) (citing City of Little Rock v. McKenzie, 239 Ark. 9, 386 S.W.2d
697 (1965)).
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declare a zoning ordinance void when, and only when, it can say that the
action of the authority having power to zone, is clearly unreasonable, arbi-
trary and capricious or an abuse of discretion"; 20 1 and
In summary, the party alleging that legislation is arbitrary has the
burden of proving that there is no rational basis for the legislative
act, and regardless of the evidence introduced by the moving par-
ty, the legislation is presumed to be valid and is to be upheld if the
judicial branch finds a rational basis for it. It is not for the judicial
branch to decide from evidence introduced by the moving party
whether the legislative branch acted wisely.202
The disparity between the lack of deference afforded quasi-judicial and
administrative decisions and the high level of deference afforded legislative
decisions is one of the two reasons this area has become so important in
Arkansas law.203 If a challenger can convince a court that the municipali-
ty's determination was administrative or quasi-judicial in nature, he receives
a de novo trial.2 04 If the municipality can convince the judge that its deter-
mination was legislative in nature, it is protected by rational basis review.
The Arkansas Supreme Court once attempted to justify this disparity, say-
ing, "If de novo review of actions by administrative boards and commis-
sions were not allowed a board or commission might act arbitrarily or un-
reasonably or even conceal the real facts and thereby protect such acts from
proper review."205 Whether or not the General Assembly and the court's
skepticism of the competency and reliability of municipal land-use boards is
warranted, it is apparent that some deference can be paid to those agencies
while still guarding against arbitrary and capricious acts.20
201. Wenderoth v. Freeze, 248 Ark. 469, 481, 452 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1970) (Fogleman,
J., dissenting).
202. M& N Mobile Home Park, 323 Ark. at 340, 916 S.W.2d at 99.
203. The second reason, which is wholly procedural, is addressed in Part IV, infra.
204. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-425 (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
205. McCammon v. Boyer, 285 Ark. 288, 293, 686 S.W.2d 421, 424 (1985).
206. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-212(h)(5)-(6) (LEXIS Repl. 1998) (where the
Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial reversal of administrative decisions
where they are not supported by substantial evidence of record or where they are arbitrary,
capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion).
[Vol. 3336
LAND-USE LAW
IV. INITIATING LAND-USE LITIGATION
There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune ....
And we must take the current when it serves,
Or lose our ventures.207
While Part III closely parses a few words in section 14-56-425 of the
Arkansas Code, the primary purpose of that code provision is to enable
judicial review of land-use decisions. Often, however, it functions to prohi-
bit judicial review entirely. The Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme
Court has compared section 14-56-425 to a thirty-day statute of limitations
on government malfeasance. 208 In construing the statutory language, the
Arkansas Supreme Court has taken the legislature to mean that those ag-
grieved with a land-use decision must use Arkansas's District Court Rule 9
to seek review in circuit court.209 So if the judiciary is unhappy with the
application of District Court Rule 9, it has only itself to blame; however, the
judiciary seems to be the only branch of state government grappling with
this issue at all.
Where Part II dealt with substance and Part III dealt with structure, this
part deals with procedure: the judicial application of section 14-56-425 of
the Arkansas Code and District Court Rule 9. The first subpart deals with
the often criticized application of District Court Rule 9 to municipal land-
use decisions. 210 The second subpart analyzes the substantial changes made
to the rule, which are now in effect. Those changes will help, in part, to
ameliorate the harsh effects of the previous rule, 211 but they may cause
problems of their own.
207. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR THE FOURTH ACT, sc. 3.
208. Green v. City of Jacksonville, 357 Ark. 517, 529, 182 S.W.3d 124, 132 (2004)
(Hannah, J., dissenting) ("I strongly believe that unauthorized and illegal acts of government
should be subject to challenge and injunction whenever and wherever found. Providing
cities with what amounts to a thirty-day statute of limitations beyond which the cities' unau-
thorized acts are untouchable seems very unwise.").
209. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of City of Little Rock v. Cheek, 328 Ark. 18, 20-21, 942
S.W.2d 821, 822-23 (1997). In addition, the current rule, which contains significant differ-
ences from the old, became effective on January 1, 2009.
210. For recent scholarly treatment, see Michael Bayless Rowe, Case Note, Lost in
Translation: Combs v. City of Springdale, An Overview of the Ins and Outs ofAppeals Pro-
cedure for Administrative Decisions by Local Governments, 61 ARK. L. REv. 351 (2008).
211. The following is a list of cases dismissed for failure to comply with section 14-56-
425 of the Arkansas Code and District Court Rule 9: Talley v. City of N. Little Rock, 2009
Ark. 60 1, - S.W.3d __; Combs v. City of Springdale, 366 Ark. 31, 233 S.W.3d 130
(2006); Green v. City of Jacksonville, 357 Ark. 517, 182 S.W.3d 124 (2004); Ingram v. City
of Pine Bluff, 355 Ark. 129, 133 S.W.3d 130 (2003); Stromwall v. City of Springdale Plan-
ning Comm'n, 350 Ark. 281, 86 S.W.3d 844 (2002); Douglas v. City of Cabot, 347 Ark. 1,
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A. Of "Appeals" and "Inferior Courts"
The enabling statutes provide that parties seeking to appeal the final
administrative and quasi-judicial decisions of municipal agencies must use
the same procedure as is used to appeal from district courts.2 12 In con-
struing this language, the Arkansas Supreme Court has taken the legislature
to mean that those aggrieved with a land-use decision must use Arkansas's
District Court Rule 9 to seek review in circuit court.213 Compliance with the
statute and the District Court Rules is mandatory and jurisdictional; 2 14 ac-
cordingly, a court must raise the question of compliance sua sponte.2 15 Fur-
thermore, courts hold appellants to a strict-compliance standard.216
The results have been criticized by both commentators and courts.
Courts found the language of District Court Rule 9 an odd fit for appeals
from the administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of municipalities.2 17 In
Wright, the circuit court dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 9.218
Although the Supreme Court ultimately reversed on this point, it had to ap-
ply the following language from Rule 9 in order to do so: "As long as the
record of the inferior court proceeding was filed with the circuit clerk with-
in 30 days of the entry of the judgment, the appeal is perfected." 2 19 The
obvious problem with the application of that language is that when the ap-
59 S.W.3d 430 (2001); Night Clubs, Inc. v. Fort Smith Planning Comm'n, 336 Ark. 130, 984
S.W.2d 418 (1999); Cheek, 328 Ark. 18, 942 S.W.2d 821; Ark. Constr. & Excavation, LLC
v. City of Maumelle, 2009 Ark. App. 874, 2009 WL 4844643 (unpublished); Franks v.
Mountain View, Ark. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 99 Ark. App. 205, 258 S.W.3d 799
(2007); Pierce Addition Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Vilonia Planning Comm'n, 76
Ark. App. 393, 65 S.W.3d 485 (2002).
212. The statute still uses the old term "inferior." See ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-425
(LEXIS Repl. 1998). "The Arkansas Inferior Court Rules were revised and renamed the
Arkansas District Court Rules, effective January 1, 2005, to comply with Amendment 80 of
the Arkansas Constitution." Camp v. State, 364 Ark. 459, 463, 221 S.W.3d 365, 368 (2006).
213. Cheek, 328 Ark. at 20-21, 942 S.W.2d at 822-23.
214. J & M Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Hampton, 347 Ark. 126,60 S.W.3d 481 (2001).
215. Stromwall, 350 Ark. at 283, 86 S.W.3d at 846.
216. Ingram, 355 Ark. at 135, 133 S.W.3d at 386.
217. Wright v. City of Little Rock, 366 Ark. 96, 99, 233 S.W.3d 644, 646 (2006) ("Our
rules fail to provide adequate procedure on appeals to the circuit court . . . . We refer the
question of what further procedure should be provided to the Arkansas Supreme Court
Committee on Civil Practice."); Cheek, 328 Ark. at 22, 942 S.W.2d at 823-24 ("Although we
are resolute in deciding the circuit court had no authority to hear Cheek's appeal, we would
be remiss in failing to point out the obvious and understandable confusion the parties and
trial court encountered when trying to interpret §14-56-425 .... We would like to suggest to
the General Assembly that it address this rather murky area caused by § 14-56-425, and
provide some clarity so as to avoid administrative-appeal problems such as the ones evi-
denced in this decision.").
218. Wright, 366 Ark. at 98, 233 S.W.3d at 646.
219. Id. at 98-99, 233 S.W.3d at 646 (emphasis added).
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peal is from a Board of Adjustment (as it was in that case), there is no infe-
rior court proceeding, nor is there an entry of judgment. In Cheek, the court
held that Rule 9 required the aggrieved party to file a record of the Board's
proceedings with the circuit court or, in the alternative, to file an affidavit
with the circuit court stating that the appellant had requested a record, but
that the Board had failed and neglected to prepare and certify it.2 20 While
holding that the circuit court had no subject-matter jurisdiction in that case,
the court also acknowledged the difficulty litigators and courts had in apply-
ing Rule 9 in like contexts: "Our Inferior Court Rules, of course, generally
deal in terms of appeals from 'entry of judgment' and appellate records pre-
pared and certified by a 'court clerk,' terms normally inapplicable to actions
taken by administrative agencies, boards, and commissions."2 2 1
Furthermore, commentators noticed the disparity between the adminis-
trative appeal procedures created by section 14-56-425 of the Arkansas
222Code and those used in other contexts. Because the subject is mostly of
historical significance and because it has received thorough treatment as
recently as 2008, I see no need to re-state and re-analyze those scholarly
critiques in depth here.223 Suffice it to say that like courts, scholars believed
that a "change in the procedure for appealing administrative decisions by
local governments" was needed.224
B. A Long Time Coming: The Revision to District Court Rule 9
Finally, in response to the General Assembly's complete failure to act,
the Arkansas Supreme Court interceded to correct the incongruities between
the realities of appeal from municipal administrative decisions, the language
of section 14-56-425 of the Arkansas Code, and the language of District
Court Rule 9. On April 17, 2008, it published the proposed changes to Dis-
trict Court Rule 9, which substantially rewrote the rule and provided for a
new subsection (f) governing "Administrative Appeals."225 On October 9,
2008, it formally adopted the recommendations of the Committee on Civil
220. Cheek, 328 Ark. at 21, 942 S.W.2d at 823.
221. Id. at 22, 942 S.W.2d at 824.
222. Rowe, supra note 210, at 352 ("Nearly every year in the last ten years, the Arkansas
Supreme Court has been asked to decide at least one case dealing with the procedure for
appealing from a local governmental body's decision on a planning and zoning matter.");
Zachary D. Wilson & Charles N. Carnes, Case Note, Judicial Review of Administrative
Agencies in Arkansas, 25 ARK. L. REV. 397, 431-32 (1972) (suggesting that the Arkansas
Administrative Procedure Act should cover local government units).
223. See generally Rowe, supra note 210.
224. Id. at 384.
225. In re Ark. Dist. Ct. R.; R. of Civ. P.; R. of Evid.; R. of the Sup. Ct. and Ct. of App.;
and R. of App. P.-Civ., 373 Ark. App'x 636 (2008) (per curiam).
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Practice, and those recommendations became effective January 1, 2009.226
The following analysis will explain the new Rule 9 as it applies to appeals
from the quasi-judicial and administrative decisions of cities in the land-use
context and will comment on the major differences between the current rule
and the prior version. Specifically, it is broken up into discussions of tim-
ing, notice, and procedure. Finally, it will raise potential issues created by
the new rule.
1. Time
The first major clarification in the rule describes when the appeal must
take place. The aggrieved party must file a notice of appeal in the office of
the circuit clerk within thirty days of the final action giving rise to the ap-
peal.227 An action is final where the municipal body has arrived at a defini-
tive position on the issue, where that decision inflicts an actual, concrete
injury, where the decision puts the body's directive into execution, and
where it concludes the parties' rights to the subject matter in controversy
without contemplating further proceedings.228 Although recent case law
from the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "final action" was the vote of
the administrative body and not the formal approval of the record,229 this
has been superseded by Rule 9(f)(2)(A). 230 It provides that "[t]he date of
decision shall be either the date of the vote, if any, or the date that a written
record of the vote is made." 2 3 1 Furthermore, the Reporter's Notes indicate
that "[t]his provision is intended to loosen the governing standard so that
parties do not lose their rights to seek judicial review of an administrative
decision based on a hyper-technical concern about precisely when the gov-
ernment body made its decision."2 32 Because this rule clarifies what is
meant by "final action," and because it gives two possible dates from which
226. In re Ark. Dist. Ct. R.; R. of Civ. P.; R. of Evid.; R. of the Sup. Ct. and Ct. of App.;
and R. of App. P. Civ., 374 Ark. App'x 653 (2008) (per curiam), available at
http://courts.arkansas.gov/court-opinions/sc/2008b/20081009/published/inreSCrules.pdf
227. ARK. DiST. CT. R. 9(f)(2)(A).
228. See Stromwall v. City of Springdale Planning Comm'n, 350 Ark. 281, 283-84, 86
S.W.3d 844, 846 (2002).
229. Combs v. City of Springdale, 366 Ark. 31, 34-35, 233 S.W.3d 130, 133 (2006).
For a discussion of the Combs decision and the contours of the "final action" requirement,
see Rowe, supra note 210.
230. ARK. DiST. CT. R. 9(f)(2)(A).
231. Id.
232. ARK. DisT. CT. R. 9, addition to reporter's notes, 2008 amendment, Tj 12. Although
the "Reporter's notes are not binding precedent," they do offer guidance to courts "as to the
rule's meaning and intent." Francis v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 371 Ark. 285, 292, 265
S.W.3d 117, 122 (2007) (noting that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to properly ac-
knowledge the Reporter's Note); see also Velek v. State, 364 Ark. 531, 534, 222 S.W.3d
182, 185 (2006).
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to begin counting down the thirty-day limitation period, it should have the
intended effect of reducing the number of appeals dismissed for lack of sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction.
2. Notice
The second major change in Rule 9 has to do with the notice require-
ments. The old rule provided that an appellant had perfected his appeal
once he filed in the circuit court either a record of the proceedings of the
municipal body or an affidavit showing that the record has been requested
but has not been provided.233 In other words, the appellant did not need to
perfect service or obtain an order granting an appeal within the thirty days
to perfect his appeal.234 That is no longer the case. The appealing party
"shall serve the notice [of appeal] on all other parties, including the go-
vernmental body or agency, by serving any person described in Arkansas
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(7), by any form of mail that requires return
receipt." 2 35 That rule of civil procedure applies to service "upon a state or
municipal corporation" and requires delivery of a copy of the summons and
complaint to the chief executive officer or other person designated by ap-
pointment or law to receive such service.236 The old rule specifically stated
that "no notice of appeal" was required and that "no summons or com-
plaint" needed to be served.2 37 Although the new service requirement is
somewhat more stringent than merely requiring the filing of the record, it is
consistent with normal civil practice and should not be an onerous burden
upon litigants.
3. The Record and the Procedure on Appeal
The last major changes to Rule 9 deal with the appeals procedure. The
appealing party "shall file certified copies of all the materials the party has
or can obtain that document the administrative proceeding" within thirty
days of "filing its notice of appeal." 238 The opposing party may supplement
these files "with certified copies of any additional documents that it believes
are necessary to complete the administrative record" within thirty days of
the appellant's filing of materials.239 Additionally, "any party" may sup-
plement the record "[a]t any time during the appeal" with "a certified copy
233. Cheek, 328 Ark. at 21, 942 S.W.2d at 823; see also ARK. DIST. CT. R. 9(b)-(c).
234. Cheek, 328 Ark. at 21, 942 S.W.2d at 823; see also ARK. DIsT. CT. R. 9(b)-(c).
235. ARK. DIsT. CT. R. 9(f)(2)(A).
236. ARK. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7).
237. Wright v. City of Little Rock, 366 Ark. 96, 99-100, 233 S.W.3d 644, 647 (2006).
238. ARK. DIsT. CT. R. 9(f)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
239. Id.
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of any document from the administrative proceeding that ... the party be-
lieves the circuit court needs to resolve the appeal." 24 0 These procedures
starkly differ from the original requirement that a party could simply file the
record to begin the appeal.2 4 1 In fact, the reporter's notes unequivocally
state that "[g]etting any needed administrative record materials to the circuit
court is a housekeeping matter, not a jurisdictional requirement." 24 2 Finally,
the new rule makes clear that the circuit court is responsible for the pace of
the appeal.243 After the "parties have made their initial filing of record ma-
terials, the court shall establish a schedule for briefings, hearings, and any
other matters needed to resolve the appeal." 244
4. Potential Problems
While the revisions of District Court Rule 9 should remedy many of
the practical problems caused by application of the old rule, new problems
could arise. The revisions create an entirely new incongruity in terms be-
tween section 14-56-425 of the Arkansas Code and Rule 9. The statute re-
quires appeals of municipal quasi-judicial and administrative agencies to
follow "the same procedure which applies to appeals in civil actions from
,,245decisions of inferior courts. The new Rule 9 is now split to apply to
both appeals from inferior courts 246 and to appeals from administrative bo-
dies.247
The problem is that now there is a different procedure for appealing
administrative decisions than there is for appealing the decisions of inferior
courts, even though both procedures come under the same rule. Since the
new rule became effective on January 1, 2009, no case law yet exists to
resolve the tension between these two separate prescriptions for the ap-
peal-the one by statute, the other by rule.248 Perhaps the General Assem-
240. Id.
241. See Cheek, 328 Ark. at 21, 942 S.W.2d at 823. Note that in lieu of the record, the
party could file an affidavit stating that the record was requested but not received. Id., 942
S.W.2d at 823.
242. ARK. DIST. CT. R. 9 addition to reporter's notes, 2008 amend. 13.
243. Id.
244. ARK. DIST. CT. R. 9(f)(2)(C).
245. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-425 (LEXIS Repl. 1998) (emphasis added).
246. ARK. DisT. CT. R. 9(a)-(e) (applying to appeals from district courts).
247. ARK. DIST. CT. R. 9(f) (applying to appeals from administrative bodies).
248. Of the opinions handed down since January 1, 2009, none has had the opportunity to
construe the new rule. See Talley v. City of N. Little Rock, 2009 Ark. 601, S.W.3d _.
(applying the prior rule to a circuit court appeal initiated in 2007); Brock v. Townsell, 2009
Ark. 224, at 6 n.2, 309 S.W.3d 179 (2009) (applying the prior rule to a circuit court appeal
initiated in 2003 but noting that the result would be the same under either version of the
rule); Ark. Constr. & Excavation, LLC v. City of Maumelle, 2009 Ark. App. 874, 2009 WL
4844643 (unpublished) (applying the prior rule to a circuit court appeal initiated in 2007);
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bly lacks authority to state the methods of appeal since the Arkansas Consti-
tution grants the Supreme Court the power to "prescribe the rules of plead-
ing, practice and procedure for all courts."249 If that is so, then surely the
entirety of section 14-56-425 is suspect including the de novo review re-
quirement and the right to a jury trial.
Another oddity exists in the new requirement that the person appealing
the administrative decision "file certified copies of all the materials the par-
ty has or can obtain that document the administrative proceeding." 25 0 Why
does the court include this requirement when it is clear that the circuit court
must still proceed de novo? 25 1 Former Justice Newbern is of the opinion
that it is unnecessary to maintain an evidentiary record of administrative
hearings in municipal land-use agencies, because the parties may introduce
entirely new evidence at trial and the administrative decisions are entitled to
no deference.252 While this should not prove problematic per se, it certainly
appears entirely superfluous.
Despite the Arkansas Supreme Court's best efforts, section 14-56-425
of the Arkansas Code is still a problem. The court's new Rule 9 marks a
substantial improvement from the confusion created by the previous amal-
gam of rule and statute; however, changes to the District Court Rules alone
do not seem to be sufficient to correct all of the problems with appeals from
city land-use agencies. The General Assembly created the real problem
with the enactment of section 14-56-425, and the General Assembly, there-
fore, must give us the real fix.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite sputters and spurts, Arkansas's land-use law is slowly develop-
ing. Since Professor Wright published his comprehensive analysis in 1980,
many substantive areas of the law have been clarified, while many more
remain shrouded in uncertainty. The area that appears to be the most signif-
icantly developed is the characterization of the nature of municipal govern-
ment decision making. The distinctions made in that area are of more than
academic interest-they determine the standard of review on appeal to cir-
cuit courts, and they determine which government bodies can make which
decisions. Hopefully, with the Arkansas Supreme Court's revisions to the
appeals procedure, fewer land-use cases will be dismissed for lack of sub-
Buck v. City of Hope, 2009 Ark. App. 105, at 3 n.1, 303 S.W.3d 85, 87 (2009) (applying the
prior rule to a circuit court appeal initiated in 2007 and noting that the new rules did not
apply to that case).
249. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3 (emphasis added).
250. ARK. DIST. CT. R. 9(f)(2)(B).
251. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-425 (LEXIS Repl. 1998).
252. Newbem, supra note 173, at 503.
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ject-matter jurisdiction, which will allow the courts to more fully explore
and explain this area of the law.
APPENDIX "A": PRE-1987 CODIFICATION INDEX
Many of Arkansas's land-use decisions were handed down prior to the
re-codification of 1987. Although judges, practitioners, and students can
cross reference case law against the notes following the statutory text in the
Code itself, the author has found it more efficient to compile and reference
the following index:
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2825:
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-402
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-403
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-404
ARK. CODE ANN. §14-56-410
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2826:
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-405
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-406
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-407
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-408
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2827:
ARK. CODE ANN. §14-56-411
ARK. CODE ANN. §14-56-412
ARK. CODE ANN. §14-56-413
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2828:
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-414
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2829:
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-413
ARK. CODE ANN. §14-56-415
ARK. CODE ANN. §14-56-416
ARK. CODE ANN. §14-56-417
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2829
(cont'd):
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-418
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-419
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-420
ARK. CODE ANN. §14-56-421
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2830:
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-422
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-423
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-424
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2830.1:
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-425
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2831:
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-401
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2833:
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-409
Did not exist prior to 1987:
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-426
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